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Abstract 
There are growing interests for studying collective behavior including the dynamics of markets, the emergence of social norms 
and conventions, and collective phenomena in daily life such as traffic congestion. In this paper, we focus on scale-free network 
and investigate the effect of number of interaction on collective behavior. In this paper, we found that collective behavior is 
affected in the structure of the social network and theta and the collective behavior was stochastic. Moreover, collective behavior 
is almost same as Schelling model, though the decision is not interactive and simultaneously. Then, we found that the collective 
behavior in Schelling model is similar to cascade model. That is, our results with heterogeneous rules or heterogeneous networks 
are possible to apply for cascade model. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
There are growing interests for studying collective behavior including the dynamics of markets, the emergence of 
social norms and conventions, and collective phenomena in daily life such as traffic congestion. Many researchers 
have pointed out that an equilibrium analysis does not resolve the question of how individuals behave in a particular 
interdependent decision situation. It is often argued "it is hard to see what can advance the discussion short of 
assembling a collection of individual, putting them in the situation of interest, and observing what they do"1.  
In examining collective behavior, we shall draw heavily on the interactions of individuals. We also need to work 
on two different levels: the microscopic level, where the decisions of the individual agents occur, and the 
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macroscopic level where collective behavior can be observed2. The greatest promise lies in analysis of linking 
microscopic behavior to macroscopic behavior3. What makes collective behavior interesting and difficult is that the 
entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated, not merely how each person does within the constraints of her 
own environment. The performance of the collective system depends crucially on the type of interaction as well as 
the heterogeneity in preference of agents4. 
Feng et al.5 brings together agent-based models and stochastic models of complex systems in financial markets 
and show how individual decisions give rise to macroscopic actions. Additionally, the heterogeneity in agents  
investment horizons gives rise to long-term memory in volatility. Using market data, Kenett et al.6 provides new 
uniformity does not only stem from an increase of correlation between markets, but that there has also been an 
ongoing simultaneous shift towards uniformity in each single market. 
There are many situations where interacting agents can benefit from coordinating their behavior. Coordination 
usually implies that increased effort by some agents leads the remaining agents to follow suit, which gives rise to 
multiplier effects. Examples where coordination is important include trade alliance, the choice of compatible 
technologies or conventions such as the choice of a software or language. These situations can be modeled as 
coordination games in which agents are expected to select the strategy the majority does7. The traditional game 
theory, however, is silent on how agents know which equilibrium should be realized if a coordination game has 
multiple equally plausible equilibria, where these can be Pareto ranked8. This silence is all the more surprising in 
games with common interest since one expects that agents will coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium9. The 
game theory has been also unsuccessful in explaining how agents should behave in order to improve an equilibrium 
situation10. 
problem or limited ability to process the information 7,11. An individ
others1,10. In particular, in the diffusion of a new technology12, early adopters impose externalities on later ones by 
rationally choosing technologies to suit only themselves. Then, individual has an incentive to pay attention to the 
decisions of others. This is known as binary decisions with externalities7. 
Threshold model7 has been postulated as one explanation for the contagion. Contagion is said to occur if one 
behavior can spread from a finite set of agents to the whole population. When can behavior that is initially adopted 
by only an infinite set of agents spread to the whole population? Morris13 shows that maximal contagion occurs 
when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbor growth, i.e., the number of agents who can 
be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k. Lopez-Pintado14 showed that there exists a threshold for the 
degree of risk dominance of an action such that below the threshold, contagion of the action occurs. He also showed 
that networks with intermediate variance (where the connectivity of the lowest connectivity nodes are not so low) are 
best for diffusion purposes. Meanwhile, Watts15 showed that when the network of interpersonal influences is 
sufficiently sparse, the propagation of cascades is limited by the global connectivity of the network; and when it is 
sufficiently dense, cascade propagation is limited by the stability of the individual nodes. Therefore, the rate at 
which a social innovation spread depends on three factors: the topology of network, the payoff gain of the innovation 
and the amount of noise in the best response processes16. Montanari17 shows that innovation spreads much more 
slowly on well-connected network structure dominated by long-range links than in low-dimensional ones dominated 
and Komatsu18 obtains the optimal network for good cascade using genetic algorithm and they show the network 
have a sufficient number of vulnerable nodes and hub node of medium size. 
To illustrate how important spatial structure is to the emergence of cooperation in society, Nowak19 and Axelrod20 
have investigated lattice models of agents confronted with a social dilemma. At the other extreme, most of human 
social networks were regarded as random networks whose nodes are connected randomly because of its large scale 
and complexity. In reality, Barabási et al. found that many complex networks have a scale-free structure21. Moreover, 
another kind of network structure small-world has been defined and researched22. Of course, the number of 
individual is large and the relationship is assumed to be complex. However, the world is much smaller than we think. 
We deal with population with scale-free network. 
In our previous work23, we showed that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the social network, the 
initial collective behavior and diversity of theta. In this paper, we focus on scale-free network and investigate the 
effect of number of interaction on collective behavior.  
219 Saori Iwanaga and Akira Namatame /  Procedia Computer Science  24 ( 2013 )  217 – 226 
In this paper, we compare Schelling model with Cascade model. And we show that collective behavior is affected 
in the structure of the social network and theta and the collective behavior was stochastic. Moreover, collective 
behavior is almost same as Schelling model, though the decision is not interactive and simultaneously. Then, we 
show that the collective behavior in Schelling model is similar to cascade model. 
2. Model 
We consider the following dynamics to describe the evolution of agents  choices through time. At time t, each 
agent plays a 22  game with each neighbor and chooses an action from the space S = {S1, S2}14,15. The 
assumption that an agent 
Otherwise, the behavior of an agent would be independent of the network structure. Payoffs from each interaction in 
each period are given by a function )',( ss , where Sss ',  and they are summarized in the following symmetric 
matrix as shown in Table 1, where 10 i . This implies that the game is a coordination game, whose strict Nash 
equilibria are (S1, S1) and (S2, S2). is {S1, S2} when the strategy profile of the 
remaining agents is is given by iNj jiii ssss ),(),(
payoffs obtained across all the bilateral games in which he is involved. 
   Table 1. payoff matrix of agent Ai. 
Choice of agent Ai Choice of other Agent 
S1 S2 
S1 i1  0 
S2 0 i  
 
Agents select the action that maximizes his benefits given the action of others in the previous period (a myopic 
best response). Therefore, if at time t the proportion of agent Ai neighbors choosing S1, which we define pi(t), is 
higher than or equal to i  i , 
namely the degree of risk dominance of action S1, specifies a lower bound for the fraction of individuals that must 
be choosing S1 in order to make action S1 preferred to action S2. If 2/1i  action S1 is risk dominant. Also, the 
more risk dominant action S1 is the lower the value of i . This rule is given by this function. 
iip : Agent Ai chooses S1 
iip : Agent Ai chooses S2                  (1) 
The model differs from cascade models which Watts or Lopez-Pintado deals with in some respects. All these 
features; simultaneity, heterogeneous rule, interactive interaction and network heterogeneity are essential to 
collective behavior. 
 Interactive interaction: Each agent can revise his behavior both of two alternatives, that is the decision is two 
ways. But, in cascade model, once a agent has switched on one alternativeS1, it remains on S1 for the 
duration of the dynamics. 
 
each time step. While in cascade model, a certain probability agents are chosen each period to revise their 
strategy 
 Heterogeneous rules: Each agent has an idiosyncratic threshold . According to the threshold, agent's behavior 
is different from each other. Whereas, the decision rule is homogeneous in cascade model. 
 Heterogeneous networks: typically modeled on regular lattices, here we are concerned with heterogeneous 
networks; networks in which individuals have different numbers of neighbors. 
3. Simulation1: Schelling model 
3.1. Settings 
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At first, we set that all agents have same payoff matrix, that is, population is homogeneous. And thetas of all 
agents are set as 0.1. Then, considering pair of agents, Nash equilibrium is for both of them to choose S1 or for both 
of them to choose S2. So, for population, Nash equilibrium is for all agents to choose S1 or to choose S2. And, we 
set a model of social network for population as regular network with 1000 agents with 10 links.
3.2. Results
We denote the collective behavior p(t) that the proportion of agents having chosen S1 in whole population at time
t. Here, we set the initial collective behavior as 0.01. And we assume that all agents choose at random at first time
step. Then, each agent makes decision depend on best response rule each time step, and then collective behavior 
turns.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results in regular network. When initial collective behavior is 0.01, which means
low proportion, final collective behaviors depends on trials. Final collective behaviors sometimes converges to 0.0
and no agents choose S1 at last, but other times converges to1.0 and all agents choose S1 at last. In latter case, there
occur contagion and triggered by small proportion of S1 spread to the whole population, which is rare case.
Fig. 1. the transition of collective behavior in regular network.
Next, we set theta at intervals of 0.1 from 0.0 to 1.0. We simulate until 100 time step, we call this as a trial.
Then, we set initial collective behavior as 0.01, and simulate 100 trials per theta and investigate the final collective
behavior p*.
Figure 2(a) shows the simulation results. The x-axis represents theta and the y-axis represents the final proportion 
of agents who choose S1, which is final collective behavior p*. And 100 trials are plotted for each theta. We found
that collective behavior depends on theta and becomes 0.0 or 1.0, stochastically. And if theta is more than or equal
to 0.2, collective behavior converges to 0.0 and all agents choose S2 at last in any trials. Otherwise theta is 0.0
collective behavior converges to 1.0 and all agents choose S1 at last. But, if theta is 0.1, collective behaviors become
0.0 or 1.0 depending on the trials.
Other viewpoints of results are shown in Figure 2(b). In this figure, the x-axis represents theta and the y-axis 
represents the histogram of the final collective behavior. And blue area means final collective behavior become 1.0 
and red area means final collective behavior become 0.0.
As for the regular network, the final collective behavior always become 0.0 or 1.0 depends on theta and trials.
When theta was more than 0.2, the histogram of the red area (p*=0.0) is 100 and the final collective behavior always
becomes 0.0. That is, if theta is narrow large, it is benefit to choose S2 for each agent and all agents come to choose
S2 at last. When theta was 0.0, the histogram of 1.0 is 100 and the final collective behavior always becomes 1.0.
That is, if theta is small, it is beneficial for each agent and all agents come to choose S1 at last. Then, collective
behavior sometimes becomes 0.0 or 1.0 when theta was 0.1, which depends on trials.
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Fig. 2. (a) final collective behavior; (b) the histogram of final collective behavior (blue means p* become 1.0 and red means p* become 0.0.).
Fig. 3. the degree distribution of scale-free network.
Next, we set a model of social network for population as scale-free network. We arrange the regular network for
scale-free network using Kawachi algorism24. Then, their average degrees are 10. Kawachi proposed generation
algorithm from regular network to various networks by each agent's with a link of the same number changing a link.
That is, a node whose number of links is large must be much larger and a node whose number of links is small must
be much smaller. When all links of each node have been considered once, the procedure is repeated several times.
For scale-free network, we set probability as 1 and times as 20. The scale-free network is organized as shown in 
Figure 3. And it is shown by log-log graph.
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Fig. 4. (a) final collective behavior in scale free network; (b) the histogram of final collective behavior in scale free network.
The simulation result in scale-free network is shown in Figure 4(a). This result is similar to the former results.
But, the range that collective behavior becomes 0.0 or 1.0, which depends on the trials is wider than regular network 
and the range is between 0.1 and 0.5. We found that when theta is between 0.1 and 0.5; it is more possible that all 
agents come to choose S1 in scale-free network than regular network. Although, as shown in Figure 4(b), when theta 
is between 0.1 and 0.5, it is also rare case that all agents come to choose S1 in scale-free network.
3.3. Consideration
With comparing two network topologies, we found that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the
social network and the theta. And we found that the boundary of red and blue area is keen in regular network is
similar to Schelling model. But, the boundary is not keen in scale-free network. And the collective behavior was
stochastic. And in regular network, the collective behavior is similar to that of Schelling model. But, in scale free
network, the collective behavior is far from that of Schelling model. it is depend on trials and it is difficult to
anticipate when theta is between 0.1 and 0.5.
4. Simulation2 One way interaction
4.1. Settings
decision is interactive and simultaneous as denoted in Section 2. In this
section, we defuse the interactive interaction and focus on the effect of two way interaction. That is, in this
simulation, agent can only change the behavior for S1.
iip : Agent Ai chooses S1 (2)
4.2. Results
We set theta at intervals of 0.1 from 0.0 to 1.0. We simulate until 100 time step, we call this as a trial. Then, we
simulate 100 trials per theta and investigate the final collective behavior p*.
Figure 5 shows the simulation results in regular network and scale free network. The x-axis represents theta and
the y-axis represents the final proportion of agents who choose S1, which is final collective behavior. And 100 trials
are plotted for each theta. Collective behavior depends on theta and trial. And the collective behavior depends on 
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theta and becomes 0.01 or 1.0, stochastically. In this model, because agent cannot change for S2, there few agents
who choose S1 at first time step remain at last time step.
And in regular network, if theta is more than equal 0.2, collective behavior converges to 0.01 and almost agents 
choose S2 at last in any trials. Otherwise theta is 0.0 collective behavior converges to 1.0 and all agents choose S1 at 
last. But, if theta is 0.1, collective behaviors become 0.01 or 1.0 depending on the trials. In scale free network, the 
simulation result is similar to that of the regular network. But, the range that collective behavior becomes 0.01 or 1.0
depending on the trials is wider than regular network and the range is between 0.1 and 0.5. We found that when
theta is between 0.1 and 0.5; it is more possible that all agents come to choose S1 in scale-free network than regular 
network.
. 
Fig. 5. (a) final collective behavior in regular; (b) final collective behavior in scale free network.
Other viewpoints of results are shown in Figure 6. In this figure, the x-axis represents theta and the y-axis 
represents the histogram of the final proportion of agents. And blue area means final collective behavior become 1.0 
and red area means final collective behavior become 0.01. We found that when theta is between 0.2 and 0.5; there
are chances that all agents come to choose S1 in scale-free network than regular network, though, it is rare case.
Fig. 6. (a) the histogram of final collective behavior in regular network; (b) the histogram of final collective behavior in scale free network.
4.3. Consideration
Similarly to the previous section, we showed that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the social
network and theta. And the collective behavior was stochastic. Moreover, collective behavior is almost same as
Schelling model, though the decision is not interactive.
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5. Simulation3: Cascade model
5.1. Settings
In previous simulation, we defuse the interactive interaction and focus on the effect of two way interaction. In
this section, we defuse the simultaneity and focus on the effect of simultaneity. That is, in this simulation, all agents
cannot decide at the same time, randomly chosen agent can only decide. This is cascade model.
5.2. Results
We denote the collective behavior p(t) that the proportion of agents having chosen S1 in whole population at time 
t. Here, we set the initial collective behavior as 0.01. And we assume that all agents choose at random at first time
step. Then, randomly chosen agent makes decision depend on best response rule each time step, and then collective
behavior turns. Figure 7 shows the simulation results in regular network. When initial proportion is 0.01, which
means low proportion, final collective behaviors depends on trials. Final collective behaviors sometimes converges 
to 0.01 and few agents choose S1 at last, but other times converges to 1.0 and all agents choose S1 at last. In latter 
case, there occur contagion and triggered by small proportion of S1 spread to the whole population.
Fig. 7. the transition of collective behavior in regular network.
We set theta at intervals of 0.1 from 0.0 to 1.0. We simulate until 10000 time step, we call this as a trial. Then, we
simulate 100 trials per theta and investigate the final collective behavior. Figure 8 shows the simulation results in 
regular network and scale free network. The x-axis represents theta and the y-axis represents the final proportion of 
agents who choose S1, which is final collective behavior. And 100 trials are plotted for each theta. Collective 
behavior depends on theta and trial. And the collective behavior depends on theta and becomes 0.01 or 1.0, 
stochastically. In this model, because agent cannot change for S2, there few agents who choose S1 at first time step 
remain at last time step.
And in regular network, if theta is more than equal 0.3, collective behavior converges to 0.01 and almost agents
choose S2 at last in any trials. Otherwise theta is 0.0 collective behavior converges to 1.0 and all agents choose S1 at 
last. But, if theta is 0.1 and 0.2, collective behaviors become 0.01 or 1.0 depending on the trials. In scale free
network, the simulation result is similar to the regular network. But, the range that collective behavior becomes 0.0
or 1.0 depending on the trials is wider than regular network and the range is between 0.1 and 0.5.
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Fig. 8. (a) final collective behavior in regular; (b) final collective behavior in scale free network.
Other viewpoints of results are shown in Figure 9. In this figure, the x-axis represents theta and the y-axis
represents the histogram of the final proportion of agents. And blue area means final collective behavior become 1.0 
and red area means final collective behavior become 0.01. We found that when theta between 0.3 and 0.5; there are
chances that all agents come to choose S1 in scale-free network than regular network, though, it is rare case.
Fig. 9. (a) the histogram of final collective behavior in regular network; (b) the histogram of final collective behavior in scale free network.
5.3. Consideration
Similarly to the previous section, we showed that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the social
network and theta. In this section, it takes 10000 time step for a trial, but, in former section it takes only 100 time
steps. And the collective behavior was stochastic. Moreover, collective behavior is almost same as Schelling model,
though the decision is not interactive and simultaneously. Then, we found that the collective behavior in Schelling 
model is similar to cascade model. That is, our former results23 with heterogeneous rules or heterogeneous networks
are possible to apply for cascade model. In these populations, each agent has an idiosyncratic threshold or networks
in which individuals have different numbers of neighbors.
Here, Morris13 deals with m-dimension lattice and shows that contagion of the action occurs below contagion 
threshold. And in a homogeneous network, where all nodes have the same connectivity, the contagion threshold
equals the inverse of the connectivity k. in this paper, k is 10, then contagion threshold suit for 0.1 in regular 
network, it is very approximate for our simulation results. Moreover, López-Pintado by mean-field approach showed 
that contagion threshold of homogeneous network is low than that of scale free network. And when the degree is 10,
contagion threshold in regular network is about 0.08 and that in scale free network is 0.2. In our results, the
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contagion threshold in regular network is about 0.2 and that in scale free network is 0.5. They are very approximate 
for our simulation results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We showed that collective behavior in cooperative relationships is affected in the structure of the social network, 
the initial collective behavior and diversity of theta. 
In our previous work, we showed that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the social network, the 
initial collective behavior and diversity of theta. In this paper, we focus on scale-free network and investigate the 
effect of number of interaction on collective behavior.  
In this paper, we found that collective behavior is affected in the structure of the social network and theta and the 
collective behavior was stochastic. Moreover, collective behavior is almost same as Schelling model, though the 
decision is not interactive and simultaneously. Then, we found that the collective behavior in Schelling model is 
similar to cascade model. That is, our results with heterogeneous rules or heterogeneous networks are possible to 
apply for cascade model. 
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